まず大飯原発の再稼動がなければ、核兵器の開発はできなくなる!

NSNSは核兵器開発の窓口を日本側の電力各社が担っていたと公表!

小出裕章氏(毎日)
事故後も原発を推進する理由として「核兵器に転用できるプルトニウムを保持したいとする国家的欲望がそこにある」と指摘


2012年4月9日
米国の国家安全保障問題専門通信社のNSNS( National Security News Service)が1991年以来、20年がかりの調査をした結果

米国のレーガン政権が核技術などの国外移転を禁ずる連邦法(カーター政権下、制定の原子力法)をなおざりにし、日本が原子力の平和利用の名の下に、
核兵器の材料となる軍事級のプルトニウムを70トンも備蓄するのを手助けしていたことを明らかにした。

米側は日本が1960年代から核開発の秘密計画を保持しているのをCIAなどの諜報活動で確認していながら、米国内で頓挫したプルトニウム増殖炉の設備や技術の日本への移転を認めるとともに、国防総省の反対を抑え込んで、英仏からの再処理プルトニウム海上輸送を容認。


キッカケは

 レーガン政権による、このプルトニウム対日支援の直接のキッカケは、1984年の米ウエスチンブハウス社の中国に売り渡し。

 これに抗議する日本側を宥めるために、レーガンの「原子力の右腕」と言われた、リチャード・ケネディが工作に動いた。

合意された日米協定は、日米の科学者が5年間にわたって研究協力を行ない、米国から輸出された核燃料(の再処理)について、30年間にわたり、日本のフリーハンドを認める内容。

 日本が米英の再処理施設に委託して使用済み核燃料から抽出したプルトニウムを日本まで輸送することも同時に認められた。

日本の権力者に核開発(核武装)の明確な意志があり、
そのためのプルトニウム生産のテクノロジー、及びハードウエアを、国民が知らないところで、ひそかに米側から受けとっていたことは、きわめて重大な問題。

NSNSの報道はまた、日本の宇宙開発が核の運搬手段開発の隠れ蓑であり、また
1991年には、日本の諜報機関が旧ソ連のSS20ミサイルの設計図とハードウエアに入手に成功
している、とも報じている。

 NSNSはさらに、日米プルトニウム協定でも、日本側の窓口を電力各社が担うなど、核開発ではなく、あくまで「民生利用」のカモフラージュが施されていた、と指摘している。

 フクイチ事故の陰には、日本政府の裏と表の二重の原子力政策があった!



アメリカは日本が(アメリカの管理のもとに)核兵器を作ることを許しています。
その理由→
①高速炉『常陽』と『もんじゅ』の使用済み燃料を再処理する技術をアメリカは日本に売ったことで明らかです。(これは、大きさが10センチ程度の小さい遠心分離機ですが、使用済み燃料の硝酸溶液から軍用プルトニウムを抽出するために必要な技術)

②アメリカはもんじゅの建設を認めた。

③兵器級Puを抽出する特殊再処理工場(RETF)の建設も認めた。








http://ikeda102.blog40.fc2.com/blog-entry-680.html
米国の安全保障問題メディア 「NSNS」
 20年がかりの調査報道で暴露 米政府 日本の軍事級プルトニウム 70トン備蓄を支援・容認 /拡散防止の連邦法があるにもかかわらず、増殖炉のテクノロジー・ハードウエアを日本へ売却/ レーガン政権下 CIAが日本政府の核武装秘密決定を確認しながら /核運搬手段 日本諜報機関 1991年 旧ソ連 SS20ミサイルの設計図などを入手  
 
 ◇ NSNS電子版 United States Circumvented Laws To Help Japan Accumulate Tons of Plutonium → http://www.dcbureau.org/201204097128/national-security-news-service/united-states-circumvented-laws-to-help-japan-accumulate-tons-of-plutonium.html

 ◇ 大沼のソースはENEニュース(NSNS電子版記事で確認!)
 NSNS: Secret Japan nuclear bomb program covered up using nuclear power industry ― Enough to build arsenal larger than China, India and Pakistan combined
 → http://enenews.com/report-secret-japan-nuclear-bomb-program-covered-up-by-nuclear-power-industry-enough-to-build-arsenal-larger-than-china-india-and-pakistan-combined

           #

 米国の国家安全保障問題専門通信社のNSNS( National Security News Service)は9日、米国のレーガン政権が核技術などの国外移転を禁ずる連邦法(カーター政権下、制定の原子力法)をなおざりにし、日本が原子力の平和利用の名の下に、核兵器の材料となる軍事級のプルトニウムを70トンも備蓄するのを手助けしていたことを明らかにする、1991年以来、20年がかりの調査結果を報じた。

 それによると、米側は日本が1960年代から核開発の秘密計画を保持しているのをCIAなどの諜報活動で確認していながら、米国内で頓挫したプルトニウム増殖炉の設備や技術の日本への移転を認めるとともに、国防総省の反対を抑え込んで、英仏からの再処理プルトニウム海上輸送を容認さえしていた。

 この米国による「プルトニウム対日支援」は、1988年に米上院が批准した日米原子力協定によって承認されたものだが、NSNSによると、発端はカーター政権時代に遡る。

 米海軍の原子力の技術者で、核問題に精通したカーター大統領は、サウスカロライナ州のサバンナ・バレーやワシントン州のハンフォードの核施設で、米国が続けていたプルトニウム生産の増殖炉研究を停止する決断を下すとともに、核技術・設備の国外移転を禁じる「1978年核非拡散法(原子力法)」を制定した。

 これにショックを受けたのはサバンナ・バレーのクリンチ・リバー増殖炉を中心にプルトニウム増殖の研究開発をあたってきた米国の原子力推進派。

 カーター政権に続くレーガン政権下、巻き返しを図り、核武装を狙って兵器級プルトニウムの備蓄を進めようとする日本側に、サバンナ・バレーのクリンチ・リバー増殖炉で蓄積した増殖技術や遠心分離器など設備を日本側に売り渡す日米原子力協定の締結に漕ぎつけた。

 レーガン政権による、このプルトニウム対日支援の直接のキッカケは、1984年の米ウエスチンブハウス社の中国に売り渡し。

 これに抗議する日本側を宥めるために、レーガンの「原子力の右腕」と言われた、リチャード・ケネディが工作に動いた。

 米国のCIA、NSAは盗聴など諜報活動により、日本政府は1969年、トップレベルで、「必要とあらば、外国からどんなに圧力をかけられようと、核兵器開発の技術的・財源的な手段を維持する」秘密決定していたことを知っていたが、CIAはこの日米秘密合意から干されていたという。

 合意された日米協定は、日米の科学者が5年間にわたって研究協力を行ない、米国から輸出された核燃料(の再処理)について、30年間にわたり、日本のフリーハンドを認める内容。

 日本が米英の再処理施設に委託して使用済み核燃料から抽出したプルトニウムを日本まで輸送することも同時に認められた。

 このプルトニウム輸送については国防総省がハイジャクなどを恐れて洋上輸送に反対(一時、空輸も検討)したが、国防総省内の知日派などが動いて、容認されることになった。

 NSNSのこの調査報道記事は、高速増殖炉「もんじゅ」の事故などに触れているが、米国が売り渡した増殖技術、遠心分離機など設備が、日本でどのようなかたちで生かされ(あるいは生かすのに失敗し)、使われたか(使うのに失敗したか)までは踏み込んでいない。

 しかし、日本の権力者にの核開発(核武装)の明確な意志があり、そのためのプルトニウム生産のテクノロジー、及びハードウエアを、国民が知らないところで、ひそかに米側から受けとっていたことは、きわめて重大な問題である。  

 NSNSの報道はまた、日本の宇宙開発が核の運搬手段開発の隠れ蓑であり、また1991年には、日本の諜報機関が旧ソ連のSS20ミサイルの設計図とハードウエアに入手に成功している、とも報じている。

 NSNSはさらに、日米プルトニウム協定でも、日本側の窓口を電力各社が担うなど、核開発ではなく、あくまで「民生利用」のカモフラージュが施されていた、と指摘している。

 フクイチ事故の陰には、日本政府の裏と表の二重の原子力政策があった!

 フクイチ事故の責任追及は、当然ながら、日本の当局による核開発疑惑の解明へと向かわなければならない。

Posted by 大沼安史 at 07:27 午後 | Permalink



http://hiroakikoide.wordpress.com/2011/12/29/mainichi-dec29/
12月29日 核兵器に転用できるプルトニウムを保持したいとする国家的欲望がそこにある 小出裕章(毎日)
2011年12月29日、小出裕章氏のコメントが毎日新聞に掲載されました。

▼東日本大震災:福島第1原発事故 「収束は見せかけ」 小出・京大助教が講演 /福岡 – 毎日jp(毎日新聞)
=====
辺野古評価書提出 知事「県外」一層固く
東日本大震災:福島第1原発事故 「収束は見せかけ」 小出・京大助教が講演 /福岡

 京都大原子炉実験所助教、小出裕章さん(62)がこのほど、小倉北区真鶴の真鶴会館で講演し、東京電力福島第1原発事故について報告。野田佳彦首相が16日に宣言した「冷温停止状態」に対し「本来の冷温停止とは似て非なるもの。事故が収束しているように見せかけている」と断じた。

 「原発の廃炉を求める北九州市民の会」の主催。約450人が参加した。

 小出さんは福島県の広大な範囲が汚染された実態を示し「福島原発事故を起こした東電と、運転を与えた国に責任がある」と声を強め「原子力村」の既得権者たちを批判。事故後も原発を推進する理由として「核兵器に転用できるプルトニウムを保持したいとする国家的欲望がそこにある」と指摘した。

 また、節電を呼びかける広報にも、火力と水力の設備容量だけで最大需要が賄えてきた資料を提示。原発再稼働に「地ならし」を進めているとして電力会社と国の姿勢を批判した。【林田英明】

〔北九州版〕





http://www51.tok2.com/home/slicer93190/10-5047.html

多くの日本人は、日本の核武装はアメリカが許さないと考えています。

しかし、アメリカはすでに方針を変更しています。

日本がアメリカの管理のもとに核兵器を作ることを許しています。

そのことは、高速炉『常陽』と『もんじゅ』の使用済み燃料を再処理する技術をアメリカは日本に売ったことで明らかです。

これは、大きさが10センチ程度の小さい遠心分離機ですが、使用済み燃料の硝酸溶液から軍用プルトニウムを抽出するために必要な技術です。

軍用プルトニウムを現存の再処理工場で抽出することは、臨界の危険があるのです。

そこで、このように小さい抽出装置が必要なのです。

この軍用プルトニウムの再処理工場RETFが現在東海村の再処理工場の隣に建設中です。



http://moebbs.net/test/read.cgi/22ch/1284562022/
☆アメリカは日本の核を容認する筈がないと言い続ける人達がいる。
たしかに昔はそうだった。イギリスから買った最初の原発、東海村の黒鉛炉の使用済み燃料の日本での再処理を許さなかった。
カーター大統領の時代には、日本がカナダから重水炉を買うことを妨害した。
兵器級Puの製造を日本にさせないためである。
しかし、最近は違う。アメリカはもんじゅの建設を認めただけでなく、
そのブランケットから兵器級Puを抽出する特殊再処理工場(RETF)の建設も認めた。
そして、そのための軍用小型遠心抽出器を動燃に販売した。
このRETFが完成すれば、日本はいつでも核兵器を生産できることになった。
☆兵器級プルトニウム239で爆縮型の小型化可能の核兵器が出来ます。



http://www.kageshobo.co.jp/main/syohyou/kakushitekakubusou.html

槌田氏の主張は、アメリカ政府は1970年代までは日本の核開発を一貫して妨害してきたが、1980年代のレーガン政権以降方針を変更して常陽ともんじゅのブランケット燃料から軍用プルトニウムを抽出することのできる特殊再処理工場(RETF)の建設を認めた。それは、中国の核が強大となり、小型化、多弾頭化が進んだので、米中の核戦争となった場合にアメリカが核攻撃を受けるおそれがあり、日本を限定的に核武装させることで、そのおそれを避けることができるとされている(20-21頁)。
 このRETF計画は1995年のもんじゅナトリウム漏れ事故、1995年の東海再処理工場の火災事故のために建設が中断されてきた。しかし、槌田氏は、2008年にも予定されているもんじゅの運転再開が実現すれば、ほぼ完成しているRETFも完成運転にこぎ着け、軍用プルトニウムの抽出ができることとなるだろうというのである(22-23頁)。
 もんじゅが正常に運転されれば、濃縮率98パーセントの軍用プルトニウムが毎年62キログラムも生産できるという。そして、もんじゅは発電を目的とするように偽装されているが、実はこのような軍用プルトニウムを製造することが目的であるとしているのである。
 私は、現在の日本政府の具体的な高官が、近い時期に核武装を計画しているという証拠はないと思う。少なくとも、本書にもそのような具体的な証拠は示されていない。しかし、槌田氏の指摘は重要である。
 発電用としてはほとんど意味をなさない「もんじゅ」が、なぜプロジェクトとして息の根を止められることなく継続しているのか、そこには発電用原子炉とは異なる目的があるのではないかと疑うに足りる十分な根拠はある。
 また、RETFなどという、およそエネルギー政策としては意味のない施設が、なぜ多額の国家予算をつぎ込んで建設されようとしているのかについても、納得のできる説明はなされていない。
 そして、日本の軍事力がプルトニウムの生産能力、核弾頭の搭載できるミサイル技術の点で、核武装の可能な段階に到達していることも否定できない。昨秋まで政権の座にあった安倍晋三氏や次の政権をねらっているとされる麻生太郎氏らがかねてからの核武装論者であることも隠れのない事実である。本書に収められたリストによれば、野党の中心をなす民主党の中にも13人もの核武装論者が含まれているという。最近では核武装をテレビで支持していた橋下弁護士が大阪府知事選挙に圧勝するというゆゆしき事態となっている。
 だから、私には槌田氏の指摘する日本核武装論には根拠がないとして切り捨てる自信はない。すくなくとも、日本の核武装の野望が現実の政権内部にあり、その計画が現実に進められているかどうかにかかわらず、その時点の政府高官が核武装をしようとすればそれを可能とする事態を招かないように、その技術的な前提となるもんじゅの運転再開をなんとしても食い止め、また、不必要なRETFの完成運転を食い止めなければならないと考えるものである。




http://www.dcbureau.org/201204097128/national-security-news-service/united-states-circumvented-laws-to-help-japan-accumulate-tons-of-plutonium.html

United States Circumvented Laws To Help Japan Accumulate Tons of Plutonium


The United States deliberately allowed Japan access to the United States’ most secret nuclear weapons facilities while it transferred tens of billions of dollars worth of American tax paid research that has allowed Japan to amass 70 tons of weapons grade plutonium since the 1980s, a National Security News Service investigation reveals. These activities repeatedly violated U.S. laws regarding controls of sensitive nuclear materials that could be diverted to weapons programs in Japan. The NSNS investigation found that the United States has known about a secret nuclear weapons program in Japan since the 1960s, according to CIA reports.

The diversion of U.S. classified technology began during the Reagan administration after it allowed a $10 billion reactor sale to China. Japan protested that sensitive technology was being sold to a potential nuclear adversary. The Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations permitted sensitive technology and nuclear materials to be transferred to Japan despite laws and treaties preventing such transfers. Highly sensitive technology on plutonium separation from the U.S. Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site and Hanford nuclear weapons complex, as well as tens of billions of dollars worth of breeder reactor research was turned over to Japan with almost no safeguards against proliferation. Japanese scientist and technicians were given access to both Hanford and Savannah River as part of the transfer process.

While Japan has refrained from deploying nuclear weapons and remains under an umbrella of U.S. nuclear protection, NSNS has learned that the country has used its electrical utility companies as a cover to allow the country to amass enough nuclear weapons materials to build a nuclear arsenal larger than China, India and Pakistan combined.

This deliberate proliferation by the United States fuels arguments by countries like Iran that the original nuclear powers engage in proliferation despite treaty and internal legal obligations. Russia, France, Great Britain as well as the United States created civilian nuclear power industries around the world from their weapons complexes that amount to government-owned or subsidized industries. Israel, like Japan, has been a major beneficiary and, like Japan, has had nuclear weapons capabilities since the 1960s.

A year ago a natural disaster combined with a man-made tragedy decimated Northern Japan and came close to making Tokyo, a city of 30 million people, uninhabitable. Nuclear tragedies plague Japan’s modern history. It is the only nation in the world attacked with nuclear weapons. In March 2011, after a tsunami swept on shore, hydrogen explosions and the subsequent meltdowns of three reactors at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant spewed radiation across the region. Like the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan will face the aftermath for generations. A twelve-mile area around the site is considered uninhabitable. It is a national sacrifice zone.

How Japan ended up in this nuclear nightmare is a subject the National Security News Service has been investigating since 1991. We learned that Japan had a dual use nuclear program. The public program was to develop and provide unlimited energy for the country. But there was also a secret component, an undeclared nuclear weapons program that would allow Japan to amass enough nuclear material and technology to become a major nuclear power on short notice.

That secret effort was hidden in a nuclear power program that by March 11, 2011– the day the earthquake and tsunami overwhelmed the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant – had amassed 70 metric tons of plutonium. Like its use of civilian nuclear power to hide a secret bomb program, Japan used peaceful space exploration as a cover for developing sophisticated nuclear weapons delivery systems.

Political leaders in Japan understood that the only way the Japanese people could be convinced to allow nuclear power into their lives was if a long line of governments and industry hid any military application. For that reason, a succession of Japanese governments colluded on a bomb program disguised as innocent energy and civil space programs. The irony, of course, is that Japan had gone to war in 1941 to secure its energy future only to become the sole nation attacked with nuclear weapons.

Energy has always been Japan’s Achilles’ heel. Her need for oil in the face of an American embargo triggered Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, and the continued shortage was a recurring theme in her defeat in that war. Only one act could take more credit for Japan’s humiliation – the splitting of the atom that gave birth to the nuclear bomb. Now Japan would turn that same atom to its own purposes ― to ensure a stable source of energy well into the next century and, equally important, to ensure that the homeland never again suffered the indignity of defeat.

Japan approached the nuclear problem the same way it tackled the electronics and automobile industries. A core group of companies were each given key tasks with long-term profit potential. Then the government nurtured these companies with whatever financial, technological and regulatory support needed to assure their success. The strategy worked brilliantly to bring Japan from post-war oblivion to economic dominance in a single generation.

The five companies designated for the development of nuclear technologies had to make major strides beyond the conventional light water reactors that had become fixtures in Japan under U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace program in the 1950s. Japan would have to do what the Americans and Europeans had failed to do – make an experimental breeder program a commercial success. Their hubris convinced them that they could. The Japanese, after all, were the masters of the industrial process. They had turned out automobiles, televisions and microchips superior to the Americans, with better quality and at less cost. Nuclear accidents are almost always the result of human error: sloppy operators without the proper education or training or who did not install enough redundancies. Such things happen to Americans and Russians, but not to Japanese.

As China, North Korea, India and Pakistan developed nuclear weapon systems, Japan and her Western allies strengthened their alliances to counter the burgeoning threat. From a secret meeting between U.S. President Lyndon Johnson and Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in the 1960s and the participation of several subsequent American and Japanese leaders, the secret transfer of nuclear technology was part of an international strategy to fortify Japan against an ever-escalating East Asian arms race. This policy culminated during the Reagan administration in legislation that dramatically changed U.S. policy. The United States ceded virtually all control of U.S.-origin nuclear materials shipped to Japan.

To the detriment of the world and her people, the Japanese government exploited the Japanese public’s well-known abhorrence of nuclear weapons to discourage the media and historians from delving into its nuclear weapons activities. Consequently, until the March 2011 tragedy, the Japanese nuclear industry had largely remained hidden from critical eyes. The less than thorough International Atomic Energy Agency, the world’s proliferation safeguard agency, also turned a blind eye.

In a rare glimpse of a Japanese industry that has remained top secret for so many decades, our investigation raises serious concerns about Japanese and Western nuclear policies and the officials who shaped those policies during and after the Cold War. International corporations and officials sacrificed the safety and security of the public to carry out the deception. Under the guise of a peaceful nuclear power program, they made huge profits.

F-Go: The First Japanese Nuclear Weapons Program
In the early 1940s, with the world locked in the bloodiest conflict in human history, scientists in Germany, Great Britain, the United States and Japan struggled to unlock from the atom a weapon of almost inconceivable power. This race to turn theory into devastating reality formed a secret subtext to the war that destroyed millions of lives using industrial warfare. In the area of theoretical physics, Japan was as advanced as her European and American rivals. She lacked only the raw materials and the sheer industrial excess to turn those materials into an atomic bomb. But Japan’s war machine was nothing if not resourceful.


Yoshio Nishina
Since 1940, the Japanese had been aggressively researching the science of the nuclear chain reaction. Dr. Yoshio Nishina had been nominated for the Nobel Prize for his pre-war work in nuclear physics. Now he and a team of young scientists worked tirelessly at the Riken, the Institute of Physical and Chemical Research, to beat the Americans to the bomb. After two years of preliminary research, the atom bomb program called F-Go began in Kyoto in 1942. By 1943, Japan’s Manhattan Project had not only produced a cyclotron that could separate bomb-grade uranium, but also had developed a team of nuclear scientists with the knowledge to unleash the atom’s unknown

power. As America built a uranium enrichment plant in the Washington desert so enormous it drew every watt of electricity from the Grand Coulee Dam, the Japanese scoured their empire for enough raw uranium to make their own bomb, with only limited success.

Japan looked to Nazi Germany for help. The Nazis, too, had been pursuing the nuclear bomb. But, by early 1945, the Allies were on the Rhine and the Russians had taken Prussia. In a last-ditch effort, Hitler dispatched a U-boat to Japan loaded with 1,200 pounds of uranium. The submarine never arrived. American warships captured it in May 1945. Two Japanese officers on board the submarine committed suicide and the shipment of uranium was diverted to Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for use in the American Manhattan Project. Without the uranium, Japan could not produce more than one or two small atomic bombs.

As the bomb programs in both countries neared completion in 1944, General Douglas MacArthur’s island-hopping campaign drew closer to Japan’s home islands. Fleets of B-29 bombers rained fire on Tokyo and other major cities. Nishina had to move his effort to the tiny hamlet of Hungman in what is now North Korea. The move cost the Japanese program three months.

On August 6, 1945, the Enola Gay dropped a single atomic bomb over Hiroshima. The blast killed more than 70,000 people outright, and in the days and weeks to come thousands more succumbed.

When word of the blast reached Nishina, he knew immediately that the Americans had beaten him to the prize. But he also had implicit confirmation that his own atomic bomb could work. Nishina and his team worked tirelessly to ready their own test. Historians such as Robert Wilcox and Atlanta Journal Constitution writer David Snell believe that they succeeded. Wilcox writes that on August 12, 1945 – three days after the Nagasaki bombing and three days before Japan signed the articles of surrender – Japan tested a partially successful bomb in Hungnam. By then the effort was merely symbolic. Japan lacked the means to produce more weapons or to deliver them accurately to the United States.

As Japan rebuilt after the war, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki came to represent the folly of Japan’s imperial aspirations as well as American inhumanity toward the Japanese. The Japanese people held nuclear weapons in abhorrence. Japan’s leaders shared that view, but, having been on the receiving end of nuclear warfare, also developed a special appreciation for the bomb’s strategic value.

As the war ended, thousands of American troops occupied Japan. After the nuclear attacks on Japan, the United States feared that the desire and ability to create this power would spread throughout the world. Washington learned that Japan had been much closer to its own nuclear bomb than previously thought. Destroying Japan’s nuclear-weapons capability became a high priority. In addition to negotiating international non-proliferation agreements, U.S. occupation troops destroyed several cyclotrons and other vestiges of Japan’s atomic bomb project to prevent Japan from resuming its nuclear program. Though the troops could demolish the physical remnants of the F-Go project, they could not destroy the enormous body of knowledge Nishina and his team had accumulated during the war.

The Beginning the Japan’s Nuclear Program
In the years to come the men behind F-Go would become the leaders of Japan’s nuclear power program. Their first priority was to stockpile enough uranium to ensure that nuclear research could continue in Japan.

The war and the atomic blasts that ended it left a strong and enduring impression on the Japanese people. They abhorred the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But the Japanese leadership recognized that in nuclear power there was an alternative to foreign energy dependence, a dependence that had hindered Japan since her entry into the industrial era.

With the surrender of Japan, the United States became the preeminent power in the Pacific. But that position was challenged in 1949 with the communist victory in China and successful nuclear tests by the Soviet Union. The communists were challenging America in the Pacific, and Japan suddenly shifted from vanquished adversary to valuable ally.

The United States was completely unprepared when North Korean troops swarmed south in 1952. Soon poorly armed, under-trained American Marines were surrounded in Pusan with their backs to the sea. For the first of many times during the Korean War, the American military commander, Gen. Douglass MacArthur, lobbied President Truman to use nuclear weapons.

Those weapons were stored on the Japanese island of Okinawa. While American troops faced annihilation in Pusan, American B-29s waited with engines running to bomb targets in China and Korea. Later in the war, when Chinese troops entered Korea, nuclear-laden bombers flying from Japan would actually penetrate Chinese and North Korean airspace. One, an F-103 jet fighter bomber, was shot down.

The Korean War is an important milestone for Japan. Only seven years after the most humiliating defeat in its three-thousand-year history, Japan served as the staging ground for the same military that had defeated her. Japan’s own military at the time was practically nonexistent. As humiliating as the American servicemen who frequented Tokyo’s nickel brothels was the realization that Japan’s defense was wholly in American hands. As Truman played the game of nuclear brinkmanship with the Chinese, it became apparent that Japan’s defense now relied on the same nuclear bombs that had sealed her World War II defeat.

In the early 1950s, the United States aggressively urged Tokyo to get involved in the nuclear power business. Having witnessed the destructive power of nuclear energy, President Eisenhower was determined to keep it under strict control. He also realized that the world would never accept a complete U.S. monopoly on atom-splitting technology, so he developed an alternative ― Atoms for Peace. Eisenhower gave resource-starved countries like Japan and India nuclear power reactors as a form of technical, economic and moral support. Lacking the indigenous resources to rebuild its economy and infrastructure, Japan quickly turned to nuclear power as the answer for its chronically energy-starved economy.

With the help of the American Atoms for Peace program, Japan began to develop a full-scale nuclear power industry. The Japanese sent scores of scientists to America for training in nuclear energy development. Desperate to regain a foothold in the international arena and reclaim its sovereignty and power after the war, the Japanese government willingly spent scarce funding on research labs and nuclear reactors.

Japan’s wartime experience had prepared her to build a nuclear industry from scratch, but with Atoms for Peace, it was cheaper to import complete reactors from the West.

Atoms for Peace supported British and Canadian nuclear exports as well as American. Britain went first, selling its Magnox plant to Japan. General Electric and Westinghouse rapidly secured the rest of the industry, selling reactor designs and components to Japan at exorbitant prices. The Japanese industry quickly became a model for other Atoms for Peace countries. A generation of brilliant young Japanese scientists came of age during this period, all committed to the full exploitation of nuclear energy.

Once the industry was vitalized, Japan resumed its own nuclear research independent from the United States. Encouraged by the Americans, in 1956 Japan’s bureaucrats mapped out a plan to exploit the entire nuclear fuel cycle. At that time the concept was only theoretical, no more a reality than the atomic bomb was when Einstein penned his infamous letter to Roosevelt in 1939. According to the theory, plutonium could be separated from the spent fuel burned in conventional reactors and used to fuel new “breeder reactors.” No one had yet been able to make it work, but this was the dawn of the age of technology. Scientists in Japan, America and Europe were intoxicated with the possibilities of scientific advancements. Japan’s central planners and bureaucrats were equally enthusiastic. The breeder reactor plan would make the most efficient use of the raw uranium Japan imported from the United States. It would wean Japan from her dependence on American energy and also create an enormous stockpile of plutonium – the most powerful and difficult to obtain bomb material.

Secret Cold War Nuclear Policies

Prime Minister Sato with President Johnson
In October 1964, communist China stunned the world by detonating its first nuclear bomb. The world was caught by surprise, but nowhere were emotions as strong as in Japan. Three months later Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato went to Washington for secret talks with President Lyndon Johnson. Sato gave LBJ an extraordinary ultimatum: if the United States did not guarantee Japan’s security against nuclear attack, Japan would develop a nuclear arsenal. The ultimatum forced LBJ to extend the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” over Japan. Ironically, this guarantee later enabled Sato to establish Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles: to never own or produce nuclear weapons or allow them on Japanese territory. The policy won Sato the Nobel Prize for Peace. The Japanese public and the rest of the world never knew that these three principles were never fully enforced, and Sato allowed the secret nuclear weapons program to go on.

In the years to come, thousands of U.S. nuclear weapons would pass through Japanese ports and American bases in Japan. Even before Sato’s historic meeting with LBJ, Japan had quietly agreed to officially ignore U.S. nuclear weapons stored in Japan. Japanese officials were shrewd enough to put nothing down on paper, but U.S. Ambassador to Tokyo Edwin O. Reischauer disclosed the pact in a 1981 newspaper interview. In 1960, the Japanese government had verbally agreed to allow nuclear-armed American warships access to Japanese ports and territorial waters. Several current and former U.S. and Japanese officials confirm Ambassador Reischauer’s interpretation, including the former Japanese Ambassador in Washington, Takezo Shimoda.

When asked about these issues in the 1980s, the Japanese government flatly denied there was any such understanding and said it was “inconceivable” that it had a different interpretation of the treaty conditions than the United States. Nonetheless, after Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki ordered his Foreign Ministry to investigate the facts, the best it could do was to say it could find no written records of the pact.

Declassified U.S. government documents make a mockery of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. The papers reveal that Japanese government officials ignored evidence that the United States was routinely bringing nuclear weapons into Japanese ports. American military planners took Japan’s silence as tacit permission to carry nuclear weapons into Japanese harbors. The American aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk, home ported for decades in Yokohama, routinely carried a small arsenal of nuclear weapons.

Japan even participated in joint military exercises in which U.S. forces simulated the use of nuclear weapons. These revelations underline the dichotomy between the Japanese government’s public policies and its actions regarding nuclear weapons.

One of the pivotal debates in Japan during the early 1970s was whether to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The treaty basically froze the nuclear status quo. The five nuclear powers retained their arsenals while the rest of the world pledged to abstain from nuclear weapons. More than a hundred countries signed the treaty. The only notable exceptions were the few states that held open the nuclear option: India, Pakistan, Israel and Japan. The debate, like most decisions on these issues in Japan, was not carried out in a public forum. But the Americans were listening, and what they heard put Japan’s nuclear ambitions in a completely new light.

Yasuhiro Nakasone was Director of the Japanese Defense Agency and one of a new generation of pro-nuclear politicians. Though he was not in favor of immediate nuclear armament, he opposed any action that would limit Japan’s right to develop nuclear weapons in the future. Nakasone was one of the principal authors of a 1969 policy paper that said in a chapter on national security: “For the time-being Japan’s policy will be not to possess nuclear weapons. But it will always maintain the economic and technical potential to manufacture nuclear weapons and will see to it that Japan won’t accept outside interference on this matter.”

Six years later Nakasone was again embroiled in the nuclear debate. At stake was Japan’s ability to go nuclear and the biggest prize in Japanese politics – the prime minister’s gavel. Nakasone assured his rise to prime minister by outwardly supporting the NPT. The price for Japan’s cooperation was President Gerald Ford’s pledge not to interfere with Japan’s nuclear programs, even when they included material and technology ideally suited to nuclear weapons use. With Ford’s guarantee, Japan finally ratified the NPT in 1976. Japan’s nuclear commerce continued unabated. The United States continued to supply enriched uranium to Japanese reactors and allowed the spent fuel to be reprocessed in Europe and the plutonium shipped back to Japan, where it was stockpiled for future use in breeder reactors.

Stopping the Spread of Fissile Material

Jimmy Carter Tours TMI Control Room
After Jimmy Carter won the presidency in 1976, he instituted an aggressive policy to control the spread of fissile materials. As a former nuclear reactor engineer on a Navy submarine, Carter knew better than any other world leader the immense power locked up in plutonium and highly enriched uranium. He was determined to keep it out of the hands of even our closest non-nuclear allies – including Japan.

Carter had good reason for this policy. Despite Japan’s ratification of the NPT in 1976, a study conducted for the CIA the following year named Japan as one of the three countries most able to go nuclear before 1980. Only the Japanese people’s historic opposition to nuclear weapons argued against Japanese deployment. Every other factor argued for a Japanese nuclear capability. By now the CIA – and its more secretive sister agency, the NSA ― had learned the position of Japan’s inner circle.

Carter knew the incredibly volatile effect plutonium would have on world stability. Plutonium is the single most difficult to obtain ingredient of nuclear bombs. Even relatively backward countries – and some terrorist groups – now possess the technology to turn plutonium or highly enriched uranium into a nuclear weapon. But refining plutonium or enriching uranium is an extremely difficult, costly task. Carter knew that by limiting the spread of plutonium and uranium, he could control the spread of nuclear weapons. He made preventing the spread of plutonium the cornerstone of his nuclear non-proliferation policy.

The Japanese were shocked when Carter entered office and promptly pushed through Congress the 1978 Non-Proliferation Act, which subjected every uranium and plutonium shipment to congressional approval and blocked a host of sensitive nuclear technologies from Japan. Carter was determined not to transfer nuclear technology or materials that Japan could use to make nuclear weapons. The decision was hugely unpopular in America’s nuclear establishment as well. America’s nuclear scientists had expected much from Carter since he was one of them: someone who knew and understood nuclear energy.

Carter’s efforts ended America’s plans to reprocess spent nuclear fuel. Carter stopped reprocessing because he feared the consequences of Korean or Taiwan stockpiling plutonium. He believed it would lead to an Asian arms race involving Japan and China as well as Korea or Taiwan.

Carter’s U.S. nuclear doctrine was enormously unpopular among America’s nuclear science elite, who viewed a plutonium-based fuel cycle as the future of nuclear energy. They saw the atom as the solution to the problems that had stalled America’s great economic boom – acid rain from coal, shortages and embargos of oil. With an almost inexhaustible supply of cheap, clean nuclear energy, America would reclaim its position as the world’s unquestioned economic leader. But for many it went beyond even that. If America could complete the fuel-cycle – complete the nuclear circle, all of humanity could be lifted up by the nuclear bootstrap. At research centers around the country and in the Department of Energy’s Forrestal Building on Washington’s Independence Avenue, enthusiasm for the breeder program reached almost a religious crescendo.

If the breeder reactor was going to revolutionize the world’s nuclear economy, went the thinking in America’s nuclear establishment, the United States would have to share it with her allies in Europe and Japan. The very cornerstone of science is the free exchange of information, and the American scientists shared openly with their European and Japanese colleagues. The cooperation ran both ways. The breeder reactor was proving to be a monumental technical challenge, and DOE was eager to learn from the mistakes of Germany, Britain and France, all of which had been working on the problem nearly as long as the United States. Carter’s policies hindered America’s efforts to develop and share a plutonium-based nuclear energy cycle.

To the chagrin of the powerful nuclear weapons and nuclear power lobbies, Carter abandoned the idea of a new nuclear renaissance. Carter’s administration ushered in an era of reduced nuclear trade and an interruption to the free flow of ideas among scientists. For men like Richard T. Kennedy and Ben Rusche at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Harry Bengelsdorf at the U.S. Department of Energy, the restraints were completely unacceptable. Jimmy Carter’s re-election defeat brought the nuclear establishment another opportunity.

Reversing Course – Reagan Undermines Carter’s Policies

Richard Kennedy
One of the most passionate nuclear believers was a career bureaucrat named Richard Kennedy. A former Army officer, he labored in obscurity at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, his career held hostage by his vehement opposition to President Carter’s nuclear policies. All of that changed after Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980. One of Reagan’s first acts as president was to effectively reverse Carter’s nuclear doctrine, which had barred the United States from using plutonium in civilian power projects with America’s friends or adversaries.

Reagan made Kennedy his right-hand man for nuclear affairs. From his new post as Ambassador at Large for Nuclear Energy, Kennedy oversaw the dismantling of the Carter policies he despised. The new administration rejuvenated American and international reliance on plutonium.

But one legacy of the Carter years hobbled America’s headlong leap into international nuclear commerce. Carter had pushed through Congress in 1978 the Atomic Energy Act, a sweeping piece of legislation that strictly limited how foreign countries could import and use nuclear materials originating in the United States. Under the Act, Congress had to approve every single shipment of reactor fuel that crossed an international border. The law was an insufferable impediment to Kennedy’s vision of unfettered nuclear commerce. So he set out to circumvent it.

In the early days of the Reagan buildup, as the massive injection of cash into America’s conventional and nuclear war-making industries dramatically increased, the administration force-fed money to the nuclear scientists designing new warheads and attempting to solve the nuclear breeder reactor conundrum.
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結局新型兵器開発によってアメリカが【不必要になったと判断したおもちゃ】を、高値で下取りさせられたのでしょうか?

核兵器もパトリオットもイージス艦も金融工学駆使したという金融爆弾も。。

所詮アジアアフリカなんてそのような位置付なの。。
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